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11 Introduction
Over the past decades, the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of ￿Protection
for Sale￿(PFS) has become the most in￿ uential one in the political economy
of trade. The PFS model provides a clear-cut prediction on the relationships
between the level of protection and the import penetration ratio: protection is
positively related to the import penetration for politically unorganized indus-
tries, but negatively related for politically organized ones. This simple relation-
ship is based on an equilibrium model where each politically organized industry
proposes campaign contribution bid function that speci￿es the relationship be-
tween campaign contribution and tari⁄. Then the government, given those bids
from industries, chooses the tari⁄s so as to maximize its objective function,
which is a weighted sum of the campaign contribution and the welfare of the
voters.
Several theoretical concerns, however, have been raised about the model.
First is the question of whether the model itself is a reasonable depiction of
reality. Should lobbies be thought of as ￿buying protection￿in a menu auction
as posited by the model? Or is it that contributions buy something else, like
access to politicians? Ansolobehere et al. (2003), for example, argue forcefully
against thinking of contributions as buying policy.
Second, as is well understood now, the menu auctions model on which the
PFS model is based, gives rise to a continuum of equilibria in general. What
pins down the equilibrium is the assumption that bids are ￿locally truthful,￿a
restriction which makes agents bid so as to be equally well o⁄ whatever tari⁄ is
chosen by the government. However, the logic of this restriction in a static model
in the absence of trembles that might make the government choose randomly,
is not apparent.
Third, the key prediction of the PFS model has been depicted as ￿un-
intuitive.￿One would expect that unlike the model￿ s prediction, protection is
positively related to a change in import penetration. This is because industries
where import penetration used to be low and has increased tend to be those
2where a comparative advantage existed but has been eroded and intuition sug-
gests that in such industries, protectionist pressures are likely to be largest. This
view is indeed consistent with ￿ndings by Tre￿ er (1993); regressing a measure
of protection on the change in and the level of import penetration ratio (and
other control variables), he found that the coe¢ cient on the former is positive
and signi￿cant, while the latter is insigni￿cant.
Despite these concerns, the PFS model has had numerous empirical sup-
port. A number of studies have estimated the protection equation derived by
the model and found that the parameter estimates follow the pattern predicted
by the model. (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay, 2000; Mitra et al., 2002; Eicher and Osang, 2002; McCalman, 2004).
Recently, researchers have extended the original PFS model by incorporating
￿rm size (Bombardini, 2004), foreign and domestic lobbies (Gawande and Kr-
ishna, 2004), lobbying of both upstream and down stream producers (Gawande
and Krishna, 2005), and labor unions and labor immobility (Matschke and Sher-
lund, 2006). While the original model accounts for tari⁄s, its quota version was
also constructed and estimated (Facchini et al., 2006). These extensions, in
e⁄ect, graft some complications onto the original PFS model and provide evi-
dence that additional factors are also essential. It should be stressed that as the
extensions typically leave its basic predictions unchanged, they seem to provide
more evidence in favor of the original PFS framework.
This paper takes a critical look at past empirical work on the PFS model.
After presenting a simple and intuitive way of outlining further predictions of
the PFS model, we discuss important issues in testing the PFS model. We
mainly focus on the following points. First, we argue that the procedure of
testing whether the signs of the estimated coe¢ cients are consistent with the
PFS model is not a formal econometric test of the PFS hypothesis. This is
because in most studies it is not clear what the alternative hypothesis is. Fur-
thermore, even in studies that test the PFS model against an alternative, only
the protection equation is tested, not the entire PFS model. Second, we argue
that the way past literature classi￿ed industries into politically organized and
3unorganized industries is not consistent with the PFS model and results in bias
of the coe¢ cients of the protection equation. We then survey the recent pa-
pers that address those issues and explain potentially promising future research
directions.
2 A Simple Exposition of the PFS Model
The exposition in this section relies heavily on Grossman and Helpman (1994).
There is a continuum of individuals, each of in￿nitesimal size. Each individual
has preferences that are linear in the consumption of the numeraire good and
are additively separable across all goods. As a result, there are no income e⁄ects
and no cross price e⁄ects in demand which comes from equating marginal utility
to own price. On the production side, there is perfect competition in a speci￿c
factor setting: each good is produced by a factor speci￿c to the industry, ki
in industry i, and a mobile factor, labor, L. Thus, each speci￿c factor is the
residual claimant in its industry. Some industries are politically organized, and
being organized or not is exogenous to the model. Tari⁄revenue is redistributed
to all agents in a lump sum manner. Owners of the speci￿c factors in organized
industries can make contributions to the government to try and in￿ uence policy
if it is worth their while.
Government cares about both social welfare and contributions made to it
and puts a relative weight of ￿ on social welfare. The timing of the game is as
follows: ￿rst, lobbies simultaneously bid contribution functions that specify the
contributions made contingent on the trade policy adopted (which determines
domestic prices). The government then chooses what to do to maximize its
own objective function. In this way, the government is the common agent all
principals (organized lobbies) are trying to in￿ uence.
An easy way to explore the restrictions imposed by this setting is to break
the problem into three parts. In the ￿rst part, ask what the cost is to a lobby,
given the contribution schedules of all other lobbies, of getting a particular
4policy chosen by the government. In other words, if p is the outcome vector1
(depicted as uni-dimensional in ￿gures below) what is the minimum amount a
lobby has to pay to get a particular p chosen?2 Call this cost Ci(p). Once
this cost is known, the second part consists of ￿nding the desired outcome for a
lobby. This is found by maximizing the di⁄erence between the lobby￿ s welfarer
as a function of p, W(p), and Ci(p) derived in the ￿rst part. Finally, since
the desired outcome could be attained by a continuum of di⁄erent contribution
functions on the part of this lobby (all that is needed is that the contribution be
large enough to make the government do what is most desired by the lobby: its
behavior at other prices is less tied down), the ￿locally truthful￿restriction is
imposed on contributions. This restriction ties down the equilibrium in a neat
way as shown below.
2.1 Deriving Costs
The objective function of the government is denoted by G(p). It is made up of
social welfare, W(p), (which has a weight ￿ given to it) plus the contributions








where the set J0 consists of the sectors that are organized. Lobby group j in J0
submits contribution schedule Bj(p). Let




This is the objective function of the government when lobby group i does not
enter the picture. Figure 1 depicts G￿i(p) which has a peak at p(i). If lobby
i wants p chosen, all it has to o⁄er is what the government would get if i was
not in the picture! In this event, the government would choose p(i) and get
G￿i(p(i)):
1All vectors are in bold, while scalars are not.
2In the small country case as the world price p￿ is given, choosing p is equivalent to choosing
the ad valorem tari⁄, t.
5Thus, if lobby i o⁄ered the government G￿i(p(i)) ￿ G￿i(p); it would be
indi⁄erent between p and p(i). Thus,
Ci(p) = G￿i(p(i)) ￿ G￿i(p)
is the minimum that needs to be o⁄ered to get p chosen. Note that as p(i)
would be chosen if i did not participate, the cost of having p(i) chosen by the
government is zero, so Ci(p(i)) = 0.
2.2 The Desired Outcome
Lobby group i has welfare Wi(p). It wants to maximize its net welfare or
Ai(p) = Wi(p) ￿ Ci(p):
This maximum occurs at pm(i) as depicted in Figure 2. Note that Wi(p)￿Ci(p)
is tangent to Wi(p) at p = p(i) as Ci(p(i)) = 0. It lies below Wi(p) elsewhere.
Now given the contribution functions of all other lobby groups, there are any
number of ways for lobby group i to get p(i) chosen by the government. All
it has to do is o⁄er a little more than Ci(p) at p = p(i) and anything weakly
below Ci(p) everywhere else. However, as this is a game, what it o⁄ers will
a⁄ect what others want the government to choose and the bribes they o⁄er.
This in turn will a⁄ect the equilibrium. It is for this reason that such games
have a continuum of equilibria.
2.3 Choosing a Contribution Function
Suppose lobby i o⁄ered contributions (subject to these being non negative) at
p 6= pm(i) so that it was as well o⁄as it is at pm(i). After all, at the ￿right price￿
any outcome can be made desirable! In this manner, its contribution function
keeps it ￿regret free￿ , at least locally. In other words, it bids max(0;B￿
i (p))
where Wi(pm(i)) ￿ Ci(pm(i)) = Wi(p) ￿ B￿
i (p) or
B￿
i (p) = Wi(p) ￿ [Wi(pm(i)) ￿ Ci(pm(i))] (1)
= Wi(p) ￿ Ki; (2)
6where Ki(= Ai(pm(i))) is a constant. Of course, B￿
i (p) will lie weakly be-
low Ci(p) since o⁄ering C(p) would reduce its net welfare below Wi(pm(i)) ￿
Ci(pm(i)). This contribution function can thus be thought of as Wi(p) where
it lies above Ai(pm(i)) in Figure 2. Note that near pm(i) contributions are pos-
itive, so that at least locally, the curvature of the equilibrium bid is the same
as that of welfare.
Restricting lobbies to contributions that are ￿regret free￿ , does two things.
First, it pins down these functions and gives a unique equilibrium. Second,
it yields the useful property that the bids have the same curvature as welfare
as is evident from equation (1).3 In e⁄ect, lobbies bid their welfare function
less a constant! However, since government chooses p (the domestic price) to
maximize the sum of ￿ weighted social welfare and total contributions, it in
e⁄ect maximizes the sum of ￿ weighted social welfare and the aggregate welfare
of all organized sectors. In other words, the equilibrium outcome of this game
is the p that maximizes







where the Kj￿ s are constants. The equilibrium outcome, thus, is as if the gov-
ernment was maximizing the sum of welfare with greater weight placed on the
welfare of organized industry groups. Consequently, equilibrium tari⁄s in this
relatively complicated setting can be characterized by performing a simple max-
imization exercise!
However, the model has predictions, other than those on the equilibrium
tari⁄ levels, which are usually not incorporated into the estimation. For exam-
ple, the contribution function in equilibrium keeps the government indi⁄erent
between the outcome in the absence of lobby i participating at all, and the
equilibrium outcome, pE or





Recall, Wi(p(i)) + Ki = 0; since i can get p(i) chosen by contributing nothing,















Hence, if the outcome is p(i) in the absence of lobby i0s participating, and
is pE or the equilibrium price vector when lobby i does participate, then lobby
i pays the di⁄erence in ￿W(p) +
P
j￿J0;j6=i
Wj(p) evaluated at these two points.
B￿















Wj(p), then equilibrium contributions must be large. Of
course, if the outcome with lobby i not participating is not very di⁄erent in
welfare terms from that when it does, then equilibrium contributions could be
small.
How can equilibrium contributions be evaluated empirically? This can easily
be done if the Wj(:) functions are known. In this case, simple maximization
exercises would yield pE and p(i). Thus, an empirical strategy boils down to a
strategy for estimating Wj(:): We will say more on this in section 5.
2.4 Solving for Tari⁄s
In the PFS model, the welfare of agents in industry j is




where ￿j(pj) is producer surplus in industry j; lj is labor employed in industry
j; wage is unity, and
Nj
N = ￿j is the fraction of agents who own the speci￿c
factor j, while T(p) + S(p) is the sum of tari⁄ revenue and consumer surplus
in the economy.
8Di⁄erentiating Wi(p) with respect to pj gives4
xj(pj)￿ij + ￿i
￿





where ￿ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise, m0
j(pj) is the derivative of the demand
for imports, and xj(pj) = ￿0
j(pj) denotes supply of industry j. Di⁄erentiating
























i2J0 ￿i = ￿L and let
P
i2J0 ￿ij = Ij which is unity if j is organized and
zero otherwise. Therefore, this equation can be reduced to
xj(pj)(Ij ￿ ￿L) + (pj ￿ p￿
j)m0
j(pj)(￿ + ￿L) = 0;
or






















i2J0 ￿i = ￿L, assuming that agent own the speci￿c factor of at most
one sector, is the fraction of the population that owns the speci￿c capital of
organized industries, and where zj =
xj(pj)




If we further use the fact that (pj ￿ p￿
j) = (tj)p￿























4This follows from the derivative of consumer surplus from good j with respect to pj being
equal to ￿dj(pj), where dj(pj) is the demand for good j:





< 0, ￿ = 1
￿+￿L > 0, and
￿ + ￿ > 0; protection is negatively related to zj=ej for politically unorganized
industries, but positively related to it if the industry is organized. Note also
that ￿L = ￿
￿
￿ and ￿ =
1+￿
￿ : If ￿ and ￿ are small and similar in their absolute
value, then ￿ is large, or the relative weight on contributions small, and the
closer ￿ and ￿ are to each other in absolute value, the closer is ￿L to unity.
Thus, coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿ that are close to zero explain both the low weight on
contributions and the high level of ￿L:
3 Issues in Testing the PFS Model
3.1 A Summary of The Evidence
Table 1 presents a summary of the empirical results in major papers in this
area. Goldeberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), and
McCalman (2004) estimated ￿ and ￿ and then derived ￿ and ￿L from those
estimates. Mitra et al. (2002) estimated ￿ and ￿L directly using the nonlinear
GMM. In all these studies, the estimates of ￿ and ￿ follow the pattern predicted
by the PFS model, i.e., b ￿ < 0, b ￿ > 0, and b ￿ + b ￿ > 0. These results appear to
support the PFS model. In what follows, we discuss some potential problems
in previous empirical studies, which may be severe enough to cast some doubts
on the validity of their results in support of the PFS.
3.2 Data on Import Demand Elasticity
As equation (4) shows, estimation of the protection equation requires estimates
of ej, the import demand elasticity. The elasticity estimates commonly used
for US studies are those of Shiells et al. (1986). The problem is that half the
estimates are of the wrong sign or insigni￿cant. They estimated import elastic-
ity industry by industry by using OLS or 2SLS. Obviously, OLS is subject to
endogeneity and measurement error bias. 2SLS as executed by them is prob-
lematic because the industry by industry sample size is very small and 2SLS
has potentially serious ￿nite sample bias. Furthermore, they controled for tar-
10i⁄s in their elasticity estimation but not for the non-tari⁄ barrier. Hence, if
researchers use their estimates, the reverse causality from non-tari⁄ barrier to
the import elasticity, which could arise with aggregation in the industry data,
cannot be controlled for. Another shortcoming of their estimates is that they
are at the three digit level of aggregation. More disaggregated data need to
be used for testing the PFS model, since testing political economy models, in
particular, should be done at as disaggregated a level as possible. At the very
least, more recent estimates, such as those of Kee et al. (2004) which are at the
six digit level, should be used.
3.3 The Classi￿cation of Industries
One of the key explanatory variables in equation (4) involves a dummy variable
for whether the industry is politically organized, Ij. Therefore, an important
issue is how to classify industries into politically organized and unorganized ones.
Past studies have used some simple rules for classi￿cation. Goldberg and Maggi
(1999) classi￿ed an industry as politically organized if its PAC contribution
is greater than a pre-speci￿ed threshold level. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000) used a regression-based procedure. Their procedure is based on the idea
that if industries are politically organized, then industries with higher import
penetration ratios are likely to make higher campaign contributions.5
Several questions naturally arise about these classi￿cation rules. First, are
their rules consistent with the PFS model? Second, do their rules correctly
distinguish between politically organized and unorganized industries? And if
there are classi￿cation errors, would that lead to bias in the parameter estimates
of the PFS model?
Imai et al. (2008b) argue forthfully against the classi￿cation rules in Gold-
5More recently, a second generation of empirical studies has taken a di⁄erent approach to
reconciling theory and the data. For example, Ederington and Minier (2005) extend the PFS
model by hypothesizing that industries can lobby for both trade and domestic policies. In their
model, it is possible that some industries are politically unorganized for trade policies and yet
make contributions for domestic policies. Matschke (2005) takes a similar approach. Since
the models by Ederington and Minier (2005) and by Matschke (2005) are more comprehensive
than the PFS model, the authors impose additional assumptions to make the models tractable
for estimation.
11berg and Maggi (1999) and in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Imai et
al. (2008b) formally derive the equilibrium relationship between campaign con-
tributions and the inverse import penetration ratio and then use the theoretical
result to provide a simple numerical example of the PFS model where the level
of the industry￿ s contribution varies greatly depending on its import penetra-
tion. Speci￿cally, they show that politically organized industries may make
very small contributions if their import penetration is high, i.e., inverse import
penetration is low. This implies that using a particular threshold of campaign
contribution as a device to distinguish between politically organized and unor-
ganized industries as is done in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) is inconsistent with
the PFS model and thus results in misclassi￿cation of the political organization.
Furthermore, in their numerical example, import penetration and equilibrium
campaign contributions are negatively correlated. This is exactly the opposite of
the relationship that is assumed by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and
most papers using their data, that classify industries as politically organized
when the import penetration and the PAC contributions per value added are
positively correlated. Imai et al. (2008b) argue that if we were to reclassify the
political organized industries, then we would obtain parameter estimates which
no longer support the PFS hypothesis.
Imai et al. (2008b) also claim that due to classi￿cation error, the estimation
strategies used in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000) cannot provide consistent estimates. In equation (4), the inverse
import penetration ratio should be treated as an endogenous regressor, as has
been discussed in the literature (e.g., Tre￿ er, 1993). Potential mis-classi￿cation
of industries makes it even more challenging to estimate equation (4), since the
political organization dummy would also be econometrically endogenous in the
presence of classi￿cation error. As Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000) were both fully aware of these problems, they used
an IV strategy which, at a ￿rst glance, appears to provide consistent estimates.
However, Imai et al. (2008b) show that if the PFS model is true, then the exis-
tence of the classi￿cation error results in the disturbance term in the estimating
12equation to be a function of the inverse import penetration ratio. It is there-
fore impossible to ￿nd an instrument that is correlated with the inverse import
penetration ratio and uncorrelated with the disturbance term as needed.
In sum, according to Imai et al. (2008b), if we are to structurally estimate
the PFS model on the data used by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000), we should not use an arbitrary classi￿cation scheme
along with the campaign contributions to generate political organization dum-
mies. The structural estimation and testing of the PFS model would require
treatment of the political organization dummies to be fully consistent with the
prediction of the PFS model.
Several papers use institutional characteristics for political organization clas-
si￿cation. McCalman (2004) classi￿es industries in Australia that ￿led an in-
quiry at the Tari⁄ Board as politically organized. Belloc (2007) classi￿es those
who participate in the meetings of the EU commission on tari⁄ policy as politi-
cally organized. They all report parameter estimates of the protection equations
to be consistent with the PFS hypothesis.
This is intriguing, since the underlying institutional setting in these studies
is far from the PFS model where campaign contributions determine protection
policies. For example, Belloc (2007) examines EU tari⁄ policy, but campaign
contributions to the tari⁄ board are prohibited. One interpretation is that
contributions are being made but are hidden because of their illegality. Conse-
quently, the political process that determines tari⁄s and NTBs can be very well
explained by campaign contribution based PFS model. Another interpretation
is that the results in support of the PFS models are spurious.
3.4 Some Testing Issues
The extent to which past studies did a stringent job of testing the PFS model
is an open question. This results from the fact that most past studies did not
formally test the PFS model. Past studies typically estimated equation (4) and
examined whether the signs of the key coe⁄cients (i.e., ￿ and ￿) follow the pat-
tern predicted by the model. However, such an estimation exercise was typically
13conducted in the absence of a well-speci￿ed alternative model. This problem was
noticed by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) who mentioned that ￿(s)trictly speaking,
we do not test the G-H model, because we do not have a well-speci￿ed alter-
native hypothesis￿ (p.1135). Indeed, their concern is real; Imai et al. (2008a)
recently showed that estimation of equation (4) is not enough to test the validity
of the PFS model against alternatives such as a simple example model, which
they call the "Surge Protection" model.
Unlike most studies, Eicher and Osang (2002) and Gawande (1998) formally
tested the PFS model. However, in our view, their results are far from satis-
factory. Eicher and Osang (2002) is a good example to make our point. They
compared the tari⁄ equation derived by the PFS model and that of the Tar-
i⁄ Function approach by using the Davidson-McKinnon non-nested hypothesis
test, concluding that the results are in favor of the PFS model. While this kind
of formal approach, when carefully done, could be very helpful in making model
comparisons, the simplistic approach traditionally being followed can be more
misleading than helpful. Even though the tari⁄ equation is su¢ cient for the es-
timation of the structural parameters, it is a small part of the entire PFS model
or the Tari⁄ Function model. Hence, testing the tari⁄ equation only could give
us misleading results.
For example, the tari⁄ equation of the Tari⁄ Function model imposes some
restrictions on the relationship between the campaign contributions and the
tari⁄s, but the tari⁄ equation of the PFS model does not. It only requires
the coe¢ cients on the inverse import penetration ratio of the politically orga-
nized and unorganized industries to have opposite signs and for their sum to
be positive, where political organization dummies are derived from the cam-
paign contributions. The PFS model, however, imposes strong restrictions on
the relationship between the tari⁄s and the campaign contribution via the menu
auction framework, but these are not present in the tari⁄ equation. Therefore,
if we just look at the tari⁄ equation, the PFS model may look less restrictive,
while this is not the case when all the restrictions are incorporated into a test.
We suspect this is the reason why in Eicher and Osang (2002) the PFS model
14was chosen over the Tari⁄ function model. To correctly execute the non-nested
model speci￿cation tests we need to impose all the restrictions of the model
on the data. This involves the full solution of the model, which is di¢ cult for
the PFS model and to the best of our knowledge, has not been done in the
literature.
3.5 Some Puzzling Results in Past Studies
As Table 1 shows, past studies typically found that political factors matter
little; the weight on welfare relative to contribution, ￿, is estimated to be very
high (i.e., the relative weight on contribution is very low). However, given that
contributions are small relative to their e⁄ects on ￿rrm pro￿ts and welfare, one
would expect a reasonably high weight on contributions, because in the PFS
model, equilibrium contributions by a group keep the government as well o⁄ as
in the absence of the lobby group, i.e., just compensate the government.6
The estimated low weight on contributions could have a number of causes.
To begin with, data on contributions is not actually used in the estimation proce-
dures of previous studies. The standard approach basically estimates equation
(4) and then the weight on welfare is backed out of the estimates of ￿ and
￿. As contributions do not explicitly enter equation (4), they are not directly
used to estimate the structural parameters. As mentioned earlier, Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) used contributions just for the classi￿cation of industries. In
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), contributions were used to see if lobbying
expenditure follows predicted patterns, but were not used to estimate the key
parameters of the model. Hence, there is no direct way for the low level of con-
tributions to in￿ uence the estimated weight on contributions relative to welfare!
If contributions data was actually used to estimate a structural model, then the
estimates of the key parameters would probably have been quite di⁄erent.
The only paper we know that actually used contribution data directly is
Kee et al. (2005). They assumed that lobbies have a ￿rst mover advantage over
6See Rodrik (1995) for an early survey of political economy models in trade and Gawande
and Krishna (2003) for a recent one of the empirical work in the area.
15government as is the norm in this literature, and looked at foreign lobbying
in the US for preferential access (which reduces tari⁄s to zero or leaves them
unchanged) assuming world prices are given.7 As a result, the welfare cost to
the US is the loss of tari⁄ revenue. This loss is, in essence, compared to the
contributions received to obtain a weight on contributions relative to welfare.
Their results suggest that the government seems to value contributions ￿ve times
more than welfare: a vast di⁄erence from the results in the Goldberg and Maggi
(1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).8
Second, it is possible that the relationship between the variables speci￿ed in
the PFS model is spurious and thus the supposedly low values for the weight on
contribution obtained by past studies can be thought of as just a misinterpre-
tation of the parameter estimates. This is the tack taken in Imai et al. (2008a)
discussed in more detail below. They showed that a simpler model than the
PFS framework yields similar estimated coe¢ cients, but without the strict PFS
interpretation.
Third, it might, of course, be the case that the government does not need
much compensation to keep it indi⁄erent to the outcome in the absence of a
particular lobby, or intuitively, that the supply of protection is very elastic at
a low price. However, the PFS model is quite clear about the determinants of
the equilibrium contribution level at a conceptual level. We argue below that
it may be possible, given the tools we have these days, to actually compute the
equilibrium campaign contributions given information of elasticities.
7In their model, preferences are given if contributions compensate for this welfare loss.
Contributions are o⁄ered if the increase in pro￿ts exceeds the full cost of obtaining them. In
equilibrium, contributions leave the government as well o⁄ as without lobbying.
8Mitra et al. (2006) estimate the model assuming all sectors are organized. For reasonable
numbers for the share of the population that is organized, they back out lower weights on
welfare than come from the standard approach.
164 Recent Findings and Interpretations
4.1 A Model with Institutional Protection
Could it be that the data is actually coming from a slightly di⁄erent setting
than the PFS framework? If data generated from a simpler model than PFS
can easily yield similar estimated coe¢ cients, then the strict PFS interpretation
being put on the coe¢ cient estimates may be misplaced. This is the key idea
explored in Imai et al. (2008a).
Imai et al. (2008a) develop and simulate such a very simple competitive
model called the "Surge Protection" (SP) model. They assume that political
organization is randomly determined. Demand and supply are subject to ran-
dom shocks. All shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. with normal distributions
though the parameters of the distributions di⁄er. Politically organized sub-
industries whose equilibrium imports exceed a given level face a quota. The
data is aggregated over subindustries. Each subindustry is politically organized
with some random variation in the political organization probability across in-
dustries. This is done to ensure that there is su¢ cient variation in the numbers
of subindustries that are politically organized within industries.9 Industry is
said to be politically organized if at least half the sub-industries are organized.
Output and prices of each industry are simulated with a uniform quota level
^ Q for all subindustries. One way of interpreting this is that there is a trigger level
of imports, ^ Q; above which the relevant agency would restrict imports if asked,
but only politically organized agencies ask for such protection. In other words,
that there are provisions for preventing a surge of imports, but only organized
industries can actually make use of these provisions perhaps because they can
overcome the usual free rider problems. Subindustry output is aggregated to
the industry level. The variables used in the estimation are then generated. The
coverage ratio was calculated as the fraction of industry output i where quota
is binding. The inverse import penetration ratio for industry i, zi, is the ratio
9With only one probability of political organization for every industry, say 0:6, the fraction
of industries that are politically organized wwould be clustered around 0:6.
17of domestic production to imports.
The SP model is based on the followng observation about institutional set-
tings. In the US for example, there are institutional channels with varying
conditions under which an industry can ask for and obtain protection. Boltuck
and Litan (1991) provided a description of the administration of such unfair
trade laws that can result in protection. One such channel that is perceived as
open to abuse today is anti-dumping. This is intended as a recourse for ￿rms
subject to foreign competitors selling their product below ￿fair￿ or ￿normal￿
price that causes injury to the domestic ￿rm. Practices such as pricing below
full cost, which need not be anti-competitive, would then be subject to duties
which could be quite high given the way such duties have been calculated in
practice in the US. See for example, Blonigen (2006). Although there are sunset
clauses built into such duties, in practice, such duties can continue for quite a
while. Safeguards are another example. Under WTO rules, safeguard actions
allow a country to temporarily protect against all imports with the intention
of allowing domestic industry time to adjust to import competition. Though
injury has to be shown, it is easy to see that such institutional measures would
allow protection more easily in times of stress, i.e., when foreign supply shifts
out and imports surge. Moreover, it is also likely to be easier for organized
sectors to obtain such protection as it involves jumping through some hoops
and because they can more easily overcome the usual free rider problems.10
In such a setting, it might make sense to think of an institutional model
such as above where government provides protection (and does so more easily
for politically organized industries) when imports exceed a trigger level. If data
generated for from the calibrated version of such a model is also consistent with
the estimates in the literature, then we might want to look for deeper tests
of the PFS model. If a setting where there are provisions for preventing a
surge of imports, but only organized industries can actually make use of these
provisions, is observationally equivalent to the data, this could explain the size
10Though the government can also intitiate such actions, they are usually initiated by
domestic industry.
18of the estimates obtained!
The parameters of the model are chosen so that the simulation is reasonably
close to the actual data in terms of the frequency of political organization, the
share of NTB covered subindustries, the mean and standard deviation of the log
of output to imports. The import demand elasticity is set at the mean of the
industry import demand elasticity from the estimation of Shiells et al. (1986).
They compare the simulation of the model to the data used in Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000). The model matches the average political organization,
NTB coverage ratio, log output/import ratio, and the standard error of log
output import ratio reasonably closely.
They then simulate the model and run the standard regression on this data
to ￿nd estimates that are close to those in Goldeberg and Maggi (1999) and
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)! This suggests the possibility that the
crucial point is that organized sectors behave di⁄erently from unorganized ones,
not that the PFS model is valid. The results also suggest that estimation of
equation (4) is not su¢ cient to conclude the validity of the PFS model against
their simple model.
They argue that their results come from the following observation. In the SP
model the protection measure is negatively correlated with the inverse import
penetration ratio. This is because an increase in imports increases the proba-
bility that it will exceed the pre-set quota. Furthermore, the interaction term
of the inverse import penetration ratio and the political organization dummy is
positively correlated with the protection measure because only politically orga-
nized industries can have positive quota. These together roughly imply that the
regression coe¢ cients of the inverse import penetration ration is positive and
that of the interaction of the inverse import penetration ratio and the politi-
cal organization dummy is negative. Furthermore, in IV estimation, for some
range of parameters, the sum of those parameters become positive as well, hence
satisfying all the conditions of the PFS hypothesis.
194.2 An Alternative Test
Imai et al. (2008b) suggest testing the predictions of the PFS model in a way
that does not rely on classifying industries as organized or not. Their estimation
procedure relies heavily on the relationship between observables implied by the
PFS model.
Once all other variables have been controlled for, the PFS model predicts
that the inverse import penetration ratio has a negative e⁄ect on the level of
protection for politically unorganized industries while it has a positive e⁄ect for
politically organized industries. As a result, controlling for all other variables,
and given z=e, politically organized industries should have higher protection.
These implications lead to the following claim: given z=e, high protection in-
dustries, i.e. those industries whose protection measures are at high quantiles,
are more likely to be politically organized and thus the e⁄ect of an the increase
in z=e on protection would tend to be that of politically organized industries:
in other words, the coe¢ cient estimate for the inverse of the import penetration
ratio converges to (￿ + ￿) > 0 as the conditional quantile given z=e approaches
its highest level of unity from below.
There are several advantages of their quantile approach. First, their method
does not su⁄er from the corner solution problem, i.e., zero protection in a num-
ber of industries, as the focus is mainly on the higher quantiles where the e⁄ect
of corner solution is minimal. Findings based on the linear model in Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Bombardini (2004), and others are likely to be sub-
ject to bias due to the existence of such corners. Second, quantile regression
results are not driven by the parametric assumption on the error term; such
assumptions are not required by the quantile regression. To address the cor-
ner solution problem, several studies (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Facchini
et al., 2006) estimated a system of equations as well as an import penetration
equation, and an equation for political organization. In these studies, the as-
sumption of normality of the error terms is usually made and this may a⁄ect
the estimation results.
20Using the data from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Imai et al. (2008b)
￿nd that the coe¢ cient on the inverse penetration ratio starts from zero at low
quantiles and decreases to negative value as the quantile rises. Note that this is
the opposite of what the PFS model predicts, casting some doubt on the validity
of the PFS model. In the simple quantile regression, the inverse import pene-
tration ratio is assumed to be an exogenous variable. However, z=e is likely to
be endogenous as discussed in the literature and hence the parameter estimates
of the quantile regression could be inconsistent. To correct for this, they use IV
quantile techniques which have been recently developed by Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2006). The the estimated slope coe¢ cients remain negative by and
large, except at the lower quantiles where they are zero.
Imai et al. (2008a) ￿nd that performing the same estimation exercise on the
arti￿cial data generated by the SP model gives estimates similar to those found
using actual data. At lower quantiles, the estimated coe¢ cients on the inverse
import penetration are close to zero, because industries at lower quantiles have
zero protection. The estimated slope coe¢ cients for higher quantiles all be-
come negative, although they do not fall with the quantile, and are statistically
signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level.
Extending the SP model by allowing the quota to be stochastically deter-
mined gives results that are even closer to the actual data. In this case they
￿nd the coe¢ cients on the inverse import penetration ratio are zero at lower
quantiles and decrease with quantile, which is consistent with the results of the
actual data. Their results overall suggest that the qualitative feature of the SP
model might be more consistent with the actual data than the PFS model.
The intuition behind the negative coe¢ cient estimate of the surge protection
model is simple. A surge in imports, which increases the import penetration
ratio, tends to result in the quota being binding, which corresponds to an in-
crease in the NTB coverage ratio. Hence, the negative relationship between the
inverse import penetration ratio and the NTB coverage ratio.
215 Direction of Future Research
Earlier we have discussed the limitation of the conventional approach, where
researchers estimate and test the PFS model mainly based on the protection
equation only. In order to test the model against alternatives such as the SP
model, we need to statistically compare the implications of the entire model
against alternatives, which includes the campaign contribution equation that
determines how equilibrium campaign contributions are determined as the out-
come of the menu auction.11 This is especially important after the results in
Imai et al. (2008a) where they argue that one cannot statistically distinguish
between the PFS model and the Surge Protection model by just looking at the
estimated coe¢ cients of the protection equation. However, one could immedi-
ately recognize challenges that need to be overcome when trying to conduct the
kinds of tests mentioned above. That is, one important component of the PFS
model is the determination of the equilibrium campaign contributions, which
involves comparisons of welfares of two di⁄erent tari⁄ policies. Since welfare is
not observed, it has to be computed based on the model. Below, we discuss an
algorithm that e¢ ciently computes the welfare given tari⁄s. Then, we explain
the required data to compute the welfare and roughly sketch the estimation
procedure.
An Estimation Algorithm





Since the arg max of




11A notable exception is Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) where they also estimated
both the protection equation and the campaign contribution equation. However, the campaign
contribution equation they estimated is a linear regression equation where the RHS variables
are possible determinants of the campaign contributions, and does not tightly correspond to
the menu auction equilibrium of the PFS model.
22is given by equation (3), it follows that the condition here should be such ￿L is






￿ + (￿L ￿ ￿i)
zi
ei: (5)
This shows that knowledge of ￿;￿L; ￿i; tari⁄s, output, imports, and import
elasticities substituted into equation (5) would su¢ ce to obtain pi(i) and thus
the vector p(i): Note that equation (5) can also be solved to ￿nd the tari⁄s that
would have obtained had i not lobbied.
As shown earlier, the contribution levels themselves would be easy to esti-
mate if we had the Wj(p) functions. However, if we take a ￿rst order approxi-
mation we do not need the entire function, only its derivative. The equilibrium
campaign contribution can be expressed as follows.12
B￿











= Hi(p(i)) ￿ Hi(pE): (6)
where13 Hi(p) = ￿W(p) +
P
j￿J0;j6=i
Wj(p). This says that equilibrium contri-
butions are essentially the di⁄erence in the value of the function Hi(p) : RN
! R between p(i) and pE: Let p(t) be a path from pE to p(i) as t goes from
zero to unity. Since the line integral is path independent, we can choose this
path as desired. In particular, we can choose it so that p(t) = pE+t
￿
p(i) ￿ pE￿

















DHi(p(t)) ￿ Dp(t)dt; (7)
12As the equilibrium bids of a lobby group equal its welfare of the lobby group less a
constant, the constants will cancel out in the expression below and so are omitted.
13Note that H has to be indexed by i.

































+[I (j 2 L ￿ fig) ￿ (￿L ￿ ￿i)]gxj (pj (t))dt:
Import demand elasticities could be taken from other sources such as Kee et al.
(2004) or estimated. zj(pj (t)) and xj (pj (t)) can be obtained by estimating the
import demand function and the output function, which can be derived from
the derivative of the log GDP function. Then we could build a moment based
estimation strategy by directly comparing estimated campaign contributions
Ci (p), to actual ones, Co.
6 Conclusion
While the PFS model has been widely studied, we argue that further implica-
tions of its predictions need to be explored and tested for a truly convincing
test. Some directions in which such research might proceed are outlined and a
critical look at the literature is provided in this paper.
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28Table 1: A Summary of Results in Past Studies (Standard errors are in brackets)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿L
Goldber and Maggi (1999) -0.0093 0.0106 70.43 0.883
(0.0040) (0.0053)
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) -3.088/10000 3.145/10000 3175 0.9819
(1.532) (1.575)
Mitra et al. (2002) -0.00799 0.01166 85.11 0.68
(35.54) (0.29)
McCalam (2004) -0.022 0.025 40.88 0.88
(0.012) (0.013) (14.63) (0.004)
29